Do managers disclose or withhold bad news

Author: yzam

August undefined, 2024

WebSep 1, 2012 · We propose that the value of the earnings reporting process as an information source lies in limiting delays in the release of bad news, either by inducing managers to disclose it... Webbetween bad-news disclosure and residual short interest, suggesting that managers withhold bad news in general. This tendency, however, is tempered when firms are …

Do Managers Withhold Bad News? - JSTOR

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Do Managers Disclose or Withhold Bad News? Evidence from Short Interest ...

Webchoose not to hold the stocks of firms whose managers have a reputa-tion for withholding bad news and analysts may choose not to follow these firms' stocks. These costs will affect managers' disclosure deci-sions as long as managers have an incentive to maintain the level of their firm's stock price through some (unspecified) mechanism.2 Not ... WebJan 16, 2009 · If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude … WebNov 1, 2008 · Prior studies provide conflicting evidence as to whether managers have a general tendency to disclose or withhold bad news. A key challenge for this literature is that researchers cannot observe… Expand 67 Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Earnings Momentum in International Markets Yiwen Dou, J. Hunton, Cameron Truong, … quotes from great female leaders

Managers’ Career Concerns and Asymmetric Disclosure of Bad versus Good News

WebJun 22, 2024 · Whether managers disclose less optimistically, though, in this private communication than they do in their public disclosures is an open question. It is difficult … WebMay 1, 2024 · Do Managers Disclose or Withhold Bad News? Evidence from Short Interest Dichu Bao; Yongtae Kim; G. Mujtaba Mian; Lixin (Nancy) Su Abstract View article PDF Add to Citation Manager Decreasing Operational Distortion and Surrogation Through Narrative Reporting Jeremiah W. Bentley Abstract View article PDF Add to Citation … shirt in hindi wordWebSep 8, 2009 · Managers weigh the short‐term price implications of disclosure against the long‐term efficiency gains due to feedback while financial analysts strategically produce information. The model can explain why managers disclose bad information (e.g., grim outlook), that reduces the stock price, and why prices respond more… View on SSRN … quotes from great football coaches

"WebNov 9, 2024 · This study examines whether managers use confidential treatment requests to conceal bad news. We show that confidential treatment requests are positively associated with residual short... " - Do managers disclose or withhold bad news

Do managers disclose or withhold bad news

WebPrior studies provide conflicting evidence as to whether managers have a general tendency to disclose or withhold bad news. A key challenge for this literature is that researchers cannot... WebJan 16, 2009 · If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of …

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WebABSTRACT Prior studies provide conflicting evidence as to whether managers have a general tendency to disclose or withhold bad news. A key challenge for this literature is that researchers cannot observe the negative private information that managers possess. WebSep 21, 2005 · If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude …

Web“Do Managers Disclose or Withhold Bad News? Evidence from Short Interest” The Accounting Review, 94 (3): 1-26. Dichu Bao, Simon Yu Kit Fung, and Lixin (Nancy) Su. 2024. “Can Shareholders Be at Rest After Adopting Clawback Provisions? Evidence from Stock Price Crash Risk” Contemporary Accounting Research, 35 (3): 1578-1615. WebAug 1, 2024 · Abstract Prior studies provide conflicting evidence as to whether managers have a general tendency to disclose or withhold bad news. A key challenge for this literature is that researchers cannot observe the negative private information that …

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WebJun 4, 2024 · We investigate whether the presence of major corporate customers affects managerial bad news withholding behaviors. Using data from a large sample of U.S. …

Webdifﬁcult for a plaintiff to prove that managers were aware of the impending bad news or that managers were deliberately withholding the news from the market. Since it is relatively difﬁcult for outsiders to identify the motive for a manager’s silence, we expect that withholding bad news is a more attractive option for a stock quotes from great athletesWebApr 30, 2024 · ABSTRACT Prior studies provide conflicting evidence as to whether managers have a general tendency to disclose or withhold bad news. A key … quotes from greatest showmanWebIf managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the … quotes from greater